Making Sense of Saudi: King’s Decree, Yemen Policy, and Wikileaks

By Matthew M. Reed

Simon Henderson’s newest article is a great springboard for a good Saudi discussion. Titled “All the King’s Women,” the article reflects on the recent decree allowing women to participate in Saudi politics. Henderson has written about Saudi for decades now–first with the BBC, then with the Financial Times, and now with the Washington Institute for Middle East Policy, a heavyweight think tank. I certainly admire his prolific authorship and steady commentary on Persian Gulf matters. But there’s a lot more to talk about.

First, the good: Henderson rightly questions whether or not Abdullah’s reforms will outlive him since they will be instituted years from now. In the meantime, Saudi Arabia could endure multiple succession crises. King Abdullah and Crown Prince Sultan may pass from the scene before women are allowed to campaign and vote in the 2015 elections and some believe the  conservative Prince Nayef could reverse Abdullah’s reforms if or when he becomes king. It remains to be seen, however, whether or not the weight of Abdullah’s reputation and vision will force his successors to keep his promises. Henderson addresses this issue, albeit briefly. This is, I think, the most pressing question moving forward.

As for Abdullah’s announcement, Henderson admits, “Saudi watchers, certainly including yours truly, didn’t see this announcement coming.” Fair enough—most didn’t, and I doubt anyone could point to a specific date on the calendar and say “Abdullah will make the announcement then.” But Abdullah’s decree was unsurprising in retrospect. Saudi officials have been hinting at it for months while most commentators focused instead on the fate of Saudi Arabia’s only real activists—female drivers. Their preoccupation is understandable: Western audiences are especially interested in women’s issues and, frankly, there’s not much else to cover if you’re focusing on Saudi unrest.

On May 5, two months after the “Day of Rage” failed to materialize, Abdul Rahman al Dahmash, the head of Saudi Arabia’s election committee, confirmed Saudi women would be allowed to vote in municipal elections in 2015, according to Gulf News. The mayor of Riyadh offered similar remarks a month earlier. On April 20, the Saudi Gazette quoted Mayor Abdul Aziz Bin Ayyaf and opened with this line: “municipal constituencies have all the facilities in place and are fully prepared for women to vote and run for election to municipal councils.” The mayor admitted he could not permit women to vote before new legislation allowed it. Even then, women’s suffrage was being spoken of by government appointees in a positive way and in the nation’s capital no less. That same day, Arab News reported that Saudi Arabia’s National Society for Human Rights refused to monitor elections slated for this month because women could not participate.

The Saudis almost never make bold decisions at break-neck speed, although monarchies can be impulsive given their top-heavy, personality-driven structure. This tendency explains Abdullah’s announcement, which was presaged by other, less dramatic official comments, as well as the extended timeline for implementation.

Up next is Yemen. Henderson suggests that President Saleh’s sudden return to Yemen was the result of indecision on the part of King Abdullah. His exact words are:

[…] King Abdullah hasn’t seemed to be making any decisions recently. A diplomatic friend recently described the monarch as “lucid for only a couple of hours a day.” And last week, there was what seemed to be the height of Saudi indecision: Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh was allowed to return home from a Saudi hospital after recovering from injuries sustained nearly four months ago — despite an apparent agreement between Riyadh and Washington that, for the future good of troubled Yemen, this shouldn’t happen.

Saleh began his recovery from an assassination attempt in Saudi Arabia in early June. He returned to Yemen five days ago without warning. While I can’t speak to claims that Abdullah is only active for a few hours a day, it seems unfair to assume Saleh’s return was the result of indecisiveness; the stakes involved in Saleh’s return were dire and clear to the Saudis since his presence could ignite civil war. Given these risks, it seems more likely that Saleh’s return was a product of calculation rather than apathy. Of course we can second-guess the wisdom of permitting his return. But a poor decision is different from indecision.

Although the Saudis enjoyed immense leverage over Saleh, whose life they no doubt saved, can we really expect the royal family to hold foreign heads of state hostage? Saleh and the Saudi royal family grew closer in recent years as their concerns intersected, these being security, border integrity, and the presence of al Qaeda, which the Saudis forced south into Yemen around 2005. Yemen’s president could not return home without Saudi permission, true—and so we must now ask what logic drove their decision. Riyadh may now be convinced that Yemen’s future hinges on Saleh, for better or worse; either he signs a forthcoming version of the flawed GCC deal or he campaigns to reinstate his authority and secure his son’s position.

In the end, the Saudis want security. The situation in Yemen deteriorated steadily leading up to Saleh’s return. And just prior, Saleh met with King Abdullah in what can only be described as an official, public, high-profile meeting. The timing of that meeting and Saleh’s quick departure afterwards may signal Saudi Arabia’s expectations: even though the Saudis have invested billions of dollars over decades supporting Saleh’s opposition, this move could be a shift to “honey diplomacy” rather than “vinegar diplomacy,” which they hope will achieve more. There’s also speculation that Saleh duped the Saudis last weekend, went to the airport under false pretenses, and escaped to Yemen. (I refuse to comment until more sources confirm the Financial Times account.)

Then there’s the juicy State Department cable Henderson cites from 2008. In all fairness, Henderson is not trying to draw any profound conclusions from the cable. But other claims made in that cable are critical because they reflect poorly on the source’s credibility. My musings here are aimed at the cable’s author and not Henderson since I’ve been itching to address this for weeks. Consider section two of that diplomatic cable:

It was related that King Abdullah is 92 years old (born 1916), he remains a heavy smoker, regularly receives hormone injections and “uses Viagra excessively.” The SAG has always kept close-hold any personal information on Royal family members, including not making public statements of individual ages.

The cable’s comment reads, “The King has been rumored to be between 82 to 87 [as of 2008]. He is in fact older if this information is correct.” That information is absolutely incorrect. Abdullah’s mother was Fahda bint Asi al Shuraim, who was married until 1920 when her Rashidi emir husband was killed. Abdul Aziz, the founder of modern Saudi Arabia and Abdullah’s father, married her shortly thereafter—meaning that 1920 is the earliest he could have been born, making him 91 now although he was most likely born around 1924. Not convinced? Remember that Abdullah’s predecessor, King Fahd, was most likely born in 1921. Why does this matter? If Abdullah was born in 1916 then he would have been Fahd’s elder. Fahd would never have succeeded King Khaled in 1982 because it would have been Abdullah’s throne to assume.

Think Twice about Riyadh

By Salman N. Al-Rashid

It’s time to stop characterizing Saudi Arabia as the regional champion of counter-revolution. While we’re at it, we should stop treating the Arab Spring as a movement that finds vindication only when political overhaul in every Arab country is complete. The downfall of regimes in Tunis and Cairo generated unprecedented calls for political opening everywhere, but this pressure has not made its way into the kingdom.

Nonetheless, many mistakenly assume that Saudi leaders feel the pressure and project this belief onto their analysis of Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic maneuvers in the region. Thus, the argument goes: Saudi Arabia is counter-revolutionary because it wants to send a stern message to citizens in monarchic regimes to remain obedient to their royal rulers.

But do Saudi leaders really feel the pressure? A genuine lack of impetus, not government repression, accounts for the absence of protests and calls for regime change in the kingdom. The kingdom’s rulers have for the most part accounted for the interests of Saudi citizens and are being repaid with stability.

Regionally, Saudi Arabia has not been the archetypal villain to the Arab protester. It has merely accounted for its national interests, as any country would. It hasn’t adopted a coherent stance on protest movements, but who says it has to (see: Obama Administration)? The kingdom’s mixed responses to movements in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, and now Syria reflect not only the complexity and dynamism of its strategic portfolio but also its growing consciousness of its own regional influence.

Let’s start in Riyadh, where the interior ministry stalks and intimidates opponents to the al-Saud family. It’s true that reform-minded liberals who have spoken out against the regime have wound up in prison for lengthy periods of time. This is a practice that should stop, and Saudi rulers would be wise to adopt basic criminal justice reforms.

But the March 11 “Day of Rage” was awfully uneventful. Why? Saudi Arabia’s economic wealth and the genuine religion-based conservatism of its population have suppressed liberal activism, and the relatively impressive extent of King Abdullah’s social and economic reform program has coopted liberal demands. Rather than contribute to counter-revolutionary paranoia, Saudi Arabia’s (stable) domestic context legitimizes and adds force to its regional diplomatic pronouncements and maneuvers.

Regionally, focusing on the Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) actions illuminates the kingdom’s stance on other protest movements.

In some ways, the Saudi-led GCC intervention into Bahrain did resemble counter-revolution. But the kingdom feared that Iranian meddling contributed to protests in the majority-Shiite island-state. There isn’t evidence to support this claim, and overplaying Iranian influence could effectively become a self-fulfilling prophecy. But did it ever occur to us that Saudi Arabia was and continues to be wrong about Iran’s role in Bahrain? After all, a long history of tensions and mistrust between Tehran and Riyadh, underlined by their sectarian rivalry, informs the latter’s anxiety about the former’s intent to extend its influence into the Gulf and destabilize Gulf countries.

The GCC then extended membership invitations to Jordan and Morocco in May. Inviting Jordan, a state in Iran’s immediate vicinity, and Morocco, a country with its fair share of sparring with Iran, to join the GCC addressed the most glaring concern of Saudi Arabia’s strategic portfolio: its Cold War with the Islamic Republic. Saudi Arabia clearly foresees a rivalry with Iran in the future that will demand resources, diplomatic wrangling, and potentially lives. In this zero-sum game, adding to one’s alliance structure deals a severe blow to the opposing side (in the context of current uprisings against Iran’s proxy in Syria, this point takes on added significance).

The Saudi-led effort to expand the GCC further addresses the kingdom’s concern with the American security umbrella. At the height of Egyptian protests, Saudi Arabia neither actively counteracted protests nor criticized Egyptians’ calls for political opening; rather, it asked that Mubarak be allowed to oversee the transition to democracy. The Saudis acknowledged that the goal of Egypt’s protesters—that Mubarak leave—would ultimately be realized; they simply did not want to behold the horror of swift American abandonment that they realized they might one day face.

Rather than naively trust American security guarantees, the kingdom is confronting the reality that even perennial alliances can have shaky foundations. It is flexing its diplomatic muscle by circumventing its longtime American ally as it seeks to construct its own regional security framework.

And then there are those cases where the kingdom has condoned or even supported protests because doing so actually serves its interests. The Libya case is straightforward; Saudi Arabia watched with satisfaction as Libyans directed their collective rage against the very man allegedly involved in a 2004 plot to assassinate then-crown prince Abdullah. In a region where personal relationships color diplomatic interactions, the Saudis’ implicit support for popular protest and approval of the NATO intervention had everything to do with the hatred Saudi leaders harbor for Muammar Qaddafi.

And now the Saudis have adopted a semi-principled approach to the disturbing extent of violence and repression al-Assad has employed against Syrians. In a rare rebuke of a fellow Arab leader, King Abdullah called on al-Assad to “issue and enact reforms that are not merely promises but actual reforms.” Saudi Arabia’s statement will only intensify regional and international pressure on al-Assad’s regime, which has been complicit in Iran’s regional obstructionism, and therefore deal a major blow to the kingdom’s rival across the gulf.

The statement further reflects Saudi Arabia’s understanding of the importance of its voice to regional developments. In a confirmation of Saudi Arabia’s regional influence,  Bahrain and Kuwait followed Saudi Arabia in recalling their ambassadors from Syria. And King Abdullah’s statement carries significant weight precisely because Saudi Arabia has remained a powerful anchor of stability during a chaotic 2011.

The Arab Spring is not a nebulous force that regimes either embrace or oppose. It is a phenomenon that has profound repercussions for every Arab states’ strategic calculus. A closer analysis of the array of Saudi actions reveals an emerging ethos of self-reliance and diplomatic confidence, not an entrenched counter-revolution hysteria.

The Kingdom and Nuclear Energy: The Proliferation Contingency

By Salman N. Al-Rashid

Matt Reed presents a compelling case for American-Saudi cooperation on the civilian nuclear front. As Reed correctly asserts, the kingdom will eventually develop nuclear technology to satisfy domestic demand for energy. But regional political developments leave the Saudis feeling insecure. I suggest that the kingdom’s contemplating developing nuclear weapons is not outside the realm of possibility.

For reasons beyond the scope of this post, a new regional Cold War between Saudi Arabia and Iran has emerged. Iran’s potential possession of a nuke would amplify the Iranian threat in Saudi eyes and naturally lead the kingdom to consider developing its own deterrent. Moreover, decaying relations between Riyadh and Washington means that, at least for now, the Saudis might find it difficult to trust the American security umbrella. A nuclear weapon might serve as an attractive option that gives the kingdom agency over its own security.

As a nuclear Iran comes closer to reality, Riyadh’s decision-makers will likely incorporate the conventional wisdom about nuclear states into its thinking about Iran. Already prone to exploit or fuel developments that serve its own strategic purposes, a nuclear Iran would feel invulnerable to attack and thus emboldened in its regional adventurism. According to a February 2008 report to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, top Saudi officials believe Iran is pursuing the weapon to “become a regional superpower” and “be a more dominant force in the Gulf” at Saudi Arabia’s expense. Gulf expert Guido Steinberg recently argued that the “main target of [Iran’s] nuclear programme is Saudi Arabia and not Israel.”

Saudi Arabia is more than equipped to engage in limited conventional conflicts that Iran might initiate as a nuclear-armed state. This is largely due to a historic 2010 arms deal between Saudi Arabia and the United States. Through the deal, worth nearly $60 billion, the Saudis received advanced aircraft as well as promised upgrades to its naval and missile defenses.

A Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) report downplays Saudi nuclear ambitions, suggesting that Saudi pursuit of a nuclear weapon would compromise this kind of American military support. Moreover, the report argues, pursuing a bomb might invite international condemnation against a Saudi state seeking to bolster foreign direct investment and continued integration into global markets. Why would the kingdom risk American support and its international position in general?

While the risk of losing international support might be a powerful disincentive, the kingdom may no longer believe in the support from its longtime American ally. The arms deal presented a bright spot in the American-Saudi relationship, but the world is fast changing, and relations between Riyadh and Washington have cooled considerably.

Popular convulsions in Egypt led to the undignified exit of Hosni Mubarak, Saudi Arabia’s staunchest regional ally. Rather than come to Mubarak’s aid, the US stood by as the Egyptian people exercised their popular will. Saudi leaders were appalled. In a startling confirmation and reinforcement of decaying relations, Saudi Arabia did not care to inform American officials of its decision to help Bahrain’s leaders control protests in March.

Tensions appear to continue indefinitely as the Americans and Saudis hold ultimately irreconcilable positions on Bahrain and on political reform in the region more generally. The same NTI report concedes that a “souring of U.S.-Saudi relations, especially when such a scenario is combined with Iran’s development of a nuclear arsenal,” might compel Saudi leaders to think about the bomb.

And because the American approach to counter-proliferation in the Middle East is intimately linked to security guarantees, the Saudis might view with deep suspicion any American attempt to slow the proliferation of nuclear know-how in the region According to a report by Joshua Pollack of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, the US hinted that it would offer security guarantees and perhaps an extension of the American nuclear umbrella over various states in order to prevent them from independently pursuing fuel-cycle know-how.

That was back in 2009. Washington may have succeeded in convincing the United Arab Emirates to “forswear the acquisition of fuel-cycle technology,” but it might not score that success with a weary Saudi Arabia.

One country yet to be mentioned is Israel. Saudi Arabia does not fear Israeli nukes. Rather, Israel’s opaque nuclear weapons program counteracts any momentum toward a nuclear free Middle East.

In May 2010 NPT members agreed to hold a conference in 2012 aimed at establishing a nuclear-free Middle East. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, along with the US, UK, and Russia, were to choose an individual facilitator for the talks and identify a site for the conference. The NPT has chosen neither a site for these talks nor an individual to moderate them. Many observers confirm that Israel’s nuclear double standard—preventing the proliferation of WMDs in the region all the while possessing a covert nuclear program of its own—is the primary stumbling block to any progress. All the while, political upheaval in the region is forcing Arab leaders to recalibrate all major foreign policy decisions.

The domino effect of nuclear proliferation is a popular theme in nuclear weapons literature. As one state develops nuclear weapons capability, others feel compelled to follow. This theory has often been applied to the Middle East and takes on added significance in the context of current regional developments. Iran’s progressing nuclear program and regional political upheaval, both of which have rattled the kingdom’s perception of its own safety, make for a proliferation perfect storm.

The Kingdom and the Atom

By Matthew M. Reed

Saudi Arabia needs nuclear power if it wants to sell oil rather than burn it at home. As of today, nearly all domestic energy in the Kingdom comes from oil and gas–and those needs are expected to triple in the next twenty years. Washington and Riyadh are now exploring nuclear options as part of a $100 billion push by the Saudis to diversify their energy portfolio. Both countries would benefit from a deal. For one, it would free up Saudi oil for export instead of consumption; global markets would be flush with hundreds of thousands of barrels of “new” crude. A transparent, legalistic nuclear deal might also refocus attention on Iran’s opaque program.

The logic is sound so long as the Saudis confirm their interests are non-military. Given the long shadow of Iran, explicit promises would be a good place to start, so might American security guarantees if the Saudis need convincing. France and Saudi Arabia agreed to develop nuclear energy in February. The deal is only the most recent of many, all of which prove the Saudis are serious about changing their consumption habits.

As Al Arabiya reported on June 2: “Saudi Arabia plans to build 16 nuclear power reactors by 2030, which could potentially cost more than $100 billion.” Abdul Ghani bin Melaibari, coordinator of scientific collaboration at King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy, told Arab News that Saudi Arabia will have two reactors in the next ten years. “After that, every year we will establish two [at an approximate cost of $7 billion each], until we have 16 by 2030.” If successful, more Saudi crude will reach the market, potentially affording the Saudis more spare capacity and a greater ability to moderate prices. Everyone wins.

As for international security, a US-Saudi deal would have to be comprehensive and transparent, in keeping with the principles of non-proliferation. Saudi Arabia is already a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty so its obligations are well known. The goal should be to isolate Iran by establishing a new standard in the Persian Gulf. This alternative model would hinge on inspections and the denunciation of nuclear weapons. This might be too subtle a point, but the Gulf can harness nuclear power without making the region radioactive.

Beyond technical issues and cost, American legislators may prove the biggest obstacle. Saudi Arabia’s intent will be questioned at tense hearings if a deal moves forward. The Kingdom’s reputation remains tainted by gross stereotypes, suspicions about 9/11, and the bitter taste left by the 1973 oil embargo, which the Saudis can’t shake so long as millions of voters remember it well.

An unnamed House staffer, quoted by Christian Science Monitor, had this to say on July 29: “There aren’t many countries you could come up with where people would be more energized in opposition to this kind of cooperation than this one.” Very true. Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, chairwoman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, confirmed as much on July 30 with a prepared statement that claimed “Saudi Arabia is an unstable country in an unstable region.” That would be news to the Saudis, for sure, given that no critical mass has hit the streets, and the regime–like others around the Gulf–has proved stable so far. The administration will have to overcome popular misconceptions like these and argue forcefully that a comprehensive nuclear deal can enhance American security, further isolate Iran, and, in due time, positively impact oil markets.

I’ll cap this off with some quick take-aways: if nuclear weapons are not part of the equation then it’s in America’s interest for Saudi Arabia, a critical oil producer, to develop new energies that allow it to sell more oil. But the administration should be prepared to fight for a deal. In recent years, both Bush and Obama have arranged massive arms sales to the Saudis in spite of reservations on Capitol Hill. Any nuclear arrangement will be an uphill battle worse than prior deals for conventional arms. It’s unclear if this administration, which has fought big battles over healthcare and the debt, is willing to fight for a partner many Americans don’t trust.

And lastly, we shouldn’t get too far ahead of ourselves: advocates of a deal should remember that a joint effort will require years of cooperation and any impact will not be felt for a decade or more. Oil market volatility could make the journey painful yet. And, if the US wants to isolate Iran with successive nuclear pacts, keep in mind that there is a ceiling for isolation—and that Iran could reach it before these arrangements make a difference.

Rashid featured on Zenko’s CFR blog

Earlier today, Micah Zenko posted a piece by our very own Salman Al-Rashid on his blog Politics, Power, and Preventive Action. Titled, “Saudi Counter-Terror Law Addresses Al-Qaeda Threat,” the article argues that genuine regional anxieties led to the drafting of a controversial law now circulating Saudi Arabia’s Shura Council. Amnesty International and others have criticized the draft law because it may ultimately criminalize dissent in the Kingdom. Rashid, however, offers a different perspective, and cites the deteriorating situation in Yemen–home to AQAP–as a major cause for the law’s consideration. Check out Sal’s article here. And here’s a taste:

This narrative [focusing on the domestic applications of an expansive CT law] assumes that the kingdom’s rulers are worried about domestic unrest. But the kingdom has remained relatively calm during chaotic times. Rather, regional developments give the Saudis genuine cause to fear potential terrorist attacks, and the final draft of the law likely will reflect this threat.

Remember that Sunni super-alliance?

By Matthew M. Reed

Back in May the Wall Street Journal printed a story about Saudi Arabia’s diplomatic campaign in search of countries that would stand up to Iran. Many saw Prince Bandar bin Sultan’s Asian tour as a warning to Washington: if America won’t guarantee Saudi security and counter-punch Iran, some thought, Riyadh will ask other friends for help. The story made for good drama but quickly faded. Like other reports, it gave the impression that US-Saudi relations were deteriorating fast. I don’t believe this and have argued against conventional wisdom. I also don’t believe a Saudi realignment of Sunni powers has much chance of success. Like it or not, Riyadh and Washington are destined (or doomed, depending on your view) to cooperate.

Think first about the countries named and the timing. Bandar visited Malaysia, India, China, and Pakistan, and Indonesia was also named as a country of interest. As for timing, the trip followed the Saudi-led GCC intervention in Bahrain in March. Some of the countries Riyadh reached out to had already offered assistance. As quoted by WSJ, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Najib Razak said “Malaysia [a Sunni-majority country] fully backs all sovereign decisions taken by Saudi Arabia and GCC states to safeguard the stability and security of the region in these trying times.”  The article also hinted that cozy Saudi-Pakistani relations might result in expanded military ties, although it’s unclear what form it would take. (The Pakistanis already operate a training mission in Bahrain but did not participate in pacifying the country.)

Like other Gulf States, Bahrain’s foreign labor draws heavily from India, Pakistan, Indonesia and Malaysia. It would make sense if Saudi reached out to these countries because their citizens were endangered. This may have actually been the primary motivation for the meetings given the negative media attention saturating Manama. I’m not willing to judge the ethical merits of the GCC intervention in Bahrain. But, as a rule, savvy leaders try to make their case before others make up their mind. It’s astounding that this simpler and more plausible explanation has been overlooked.

As for China, let’s stop hyperventilating. Bandar’s visit was most likely a gesture of balance. Visiting the other major regional powers, especially India, required him to visit China. He wasn’t necessarily seeking a new guardian of the Persian Gulf. I say this because the Chinese aren’t interested, can’t project power like the US, and are having trouble laying claim to the South China Sea right now, let alone the Persian Gulf. And don’t forget China’s habitual reluctance leading up to UN votes on Iranian sanctions. It’s no secret the Saudis perceive Iran to be their primary threat. Beijing knows this and isn’t eager to commit itself since conflict is entirely possible. Beijing would rather enjoy the party and let the Americans pick up the tab–which we’ll do for the foreseeable future.

But let’s pretend Riyadh established super-Sunni alliance including Malaysia, Pakistan, Indonesia, and other central Asian countries. The next question is: What would these countries offer? The answer is very little.

Start with Malaysia and Indonesia, each with sizable militaries and Sunni populations. Since the end of the Cold War, both have provided peacekeepers in Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Somalia, to name just three missions. For Indonesia, peacekeeping is a means of rehabilitating the country’s image after Suharto. Malaysia has been active much the same–always keen on bolstering their brand through participation. Judging by the size and duration of deployments in the past fifty years, it’s obvious neither can muster the offensive force needed to hurt or deter Iran. Even then, if they did, they’d most likely do so under the auspices of the United Nations given their preoccupation with international standards of legitimacy. Adventurism and religious ideology motivate neither country’s armed forced.

Pakistan might be more promising. After all, Pakistan is the only country to make the list that actually borders Iran. And relations between the two have historically been positive, punctuated by episodes like the Afghan jihad, which was aided by the CIA, Pakistan’s ISI, and Saudi intelligence. They also maintain over 600,000 active duty personnel (thus ranking them seventh in the world). As is so often the case with Pakistan, however, any optimism would not be deserved. The country is currently under siege thanks to a toxic mix of homegrown and international jihadists. The situation is complicated further by lawlessness in the West, sectarian strife in major cities like Karachi, and a pronounced schism between Pakistan’s  intelligence apparatus and the military. Pakistan has other problems, for sure. And they’re all infinitely more troubling than a threat posed by Iran even if it practices a different kind of Islam.

If the Saudis want more friends, good for them. But there’s no replacement for American power in the Gulf. The truth is this: Iran is an afterthought for many countries, no matter what religion they practice. Islam is no substitute for proximity.

Nowhere Near Rock Bottom

By Matthew M. Reed

Rumor has it American-Saudi relations have reached rock bottom. As told and retold, the Saudis grew anxious after Mubarak’s exit in February. Their friend’s demise was a worrisome signal for the Kingdom: the United States, their long-time ally and architect of the status quo, was suddenly a reluctant agent of change. The region may be changing but there is little reason to believe the relationship is deeply troubled. Mutual concerns guarantee cooperation at the highest levels.

Like other alliances, US-Saudi policies are not always synchronized. But the Saudi response to the Arab Spring has been more mixed than critics admit. The Kingdom did indeed send troops to Bahrain in March, thus giving Bahrain a freer hand for crushing dissent. Other moves have been less controversial and consistent with American aims. On June 10, Bahrain’s Foreign Minister told the Washington Post that a Saudi-sponsored GCC aid package would be especially helpful for improving the conditions of the second-class Shia minority. King Abdullah also pledged $130 billion for increased salaries, housing, and religious institutions at home—all of which are bloodless investments even if they are counter-revolutionary. Only if the Saudis cross the threshold of violence might the US reassess the relationship but the chances of that are slim.

Roosevelt meets Abdul Aziz on the USS Quincy in 1945

President Obama responded in a manner befitting the leader of the free world. On May 19, two months after the Bahraini intervention, Obama criticized the Khalifa regime specifically for its “mass arrests and brute force.” He also offered the following: “The United States supports a set of universal rights. And these rights include free speech, the freedom of peaceful assembly, the freedom of religion, equality for men and women under the rule of law, and the right to choose your own leaders—whether you live in Baghdad or Damascus, Sanaa or Tehran.” Note the absence of Riyadh in that statement. Also note the idealistic tone, so very different from Saudi pragmatism.

Diverging American and Saudi responses should raise alarms. But this is not the whole story. The Saudis have also played a positive role in Yemen, where the stakes are high. This partially explains why the US has not criticized the Kingdom outright. Relations are further buoyed by shared strategic interests like counter-terrorism, Iran, and oil. These issues will not go away soon and the Arab Spring will likely force the two countries to cooperate even more.

In Yemen, the Saudis negotiated an exit plan for President Ali Abdullah Saleh, and, after he failed to sign on, they seized the opportunity presented by a new crisis. Secretary Clinton praised the Saudi-led initiative on May 22 when she said, “The concerted efforts of the international community, led by the GCC, have been tireless.” Saleh refused to sign three times, resulting in chaos. On June 3, he was badly wounded in an attack on his presidential compound, and two days later he arrived in Saudi Arabia for treatment. The ultimate test will be whether or not he is allowed to return home. The Saudis now enjoy more leverage over Saleh than they could have ever hoped for and they need a peaceful resolution in Yemen. The US wants the same.

Terrorism colors all talk about Yemen and al Qaeda’s Yemeni affiliate remains active and dangerous. Saudi Arabia’s tribal affiliations there and millions of dollars spent over decades in Yemen grant it some influence. More importantly, these relationships offer the Saudis real insight into the inner workings of a country edging toward oblivion. Saudi intelligence—combined with American assets and the ability to strike militant targets—will prove decisive if al Qaeda flexes its muscle. Further CT cooperation is predestined.

Other than al Qaeda, Iran remains a major preoccupation for American and Saudi leaders. For President Obama, a nuclear Iran is “unacceptable.” King Abdullah has even urged the US to bomb the Islamic Republic. But the Arab street generally rejects this urgency. The 2010 Arab Public Opinion Poll  found that 57 percent of Arabs believe Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would be “positive” for the region. This is bad news for American and Saudi leaders if the Arab Spring produces governments that reflect the popular will. With Egypt sidelined, they may find themselves the only two major powers opposed to Iran.

Oil and Saudi spare production capacity make further cooperation automatic. For decades now the Saudis have been sensitive to market disruptions (e.g. the Gulf War) and pricing that could make oil unattractive. That said, Saudi Arabia was thwarted by OPEC price hawks last month. The country’s Oil Minister, Ali al Naimi, was especially blunt. He told reporters, “This is one of the worst meetings we have ever had.” Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE proposed an increase of 1.5 million barrels per day but the meeting broke down after Iran and others rejected the motion. The Saudis plan to increase production regardless of OPEC’s reservations since they and their GCC companions have the power to pump more oil. (The rest of OPEC’s members operate at or near maximum capacity.)

The US and Saudi Arabia remain status quo powers where it counts: both countries need a resolution in Yemen; terrorism demands cooperation because other countries are focusing inward; joint efforts may become the only option if Iran becomes less of a priority for others; and Saudi spare capacity could make or break the global recession, not to mention President Obama’s reelection prospects. For all these reasons, US-Saudi relations will come nowhere near rock bottom.